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This paper analyzes the price transmission of canola in the international market, the 
market power of canola exporting countries over Japan, and the relationship between 
them.  In  the  estimation  of  price  transmission,  asymmetric  price  transmission  from 
futures prices in Winnipeg to export prices of Canadian canola importers was estimated 
using threshold autoregressive model with cointegration tests. Significant asymmetry 
was found in the Canadian canola export to Japan in such a way that Canada enjoyed 
long-lasting excess profits over Japan. Meanwhile, the results also showed that Mexico 
and the U.S. enjoyed the long-term excess profits over Canada. In the estimation of 
market power, considering the existence of adjustment process in Canada and Australia, 
linear-quadratic (LQ) dynamic duopoly model was employed. According to the results, 
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close  to  competitive  level.  The  implication  for  Japan’s  canola  import  is  that  Japan 
should diversify the origins of canola or import more from such countries that have less 
market power like Australia. This paper contributes in that it empirically showed the 
relationship between APT using TAR model and market power using LQ model. 
 




Canola oil consumption has been the largest among vegetable oils in Japan. Oil made of 
canola,  the  low  ercic  acid  rapeseed,  is  considered  to  be  a  healthy  oil  and  is  most 
preferred of all vegetable oils in Japan. The annual supply of fats and oils in Japan is 
roughly 3 million tons every year and that of canola oil is 1 million tons. Almost all 
canola oil is produced in Japan, and almost all canola is imported. Japan has been the 
world largest importer of canola, whose imported quantity is more than 2 million tons a 
year. Japan imports canola mainly from Canada, whose share is nearly 90% on average 
from 1988 to 2009. Japan also imports canola from Australia, but the share is less than 10% on average. 
What  is  the  effect  of  the  heavy  dependence  of  Japan’s  canola  import  on 
Canada? And what strategies should Japan develop on canola import? The purpose of 
this study is to estimate the asymmetric price transmission (APT) and market power in 
the international canola export market, especially focusing on Japan as an importer. 
Threshold  autoregressive  (TAR)  model  is  employed  in  estimating  APT  and  linear- 
quadratic (LQ) model is used to estimate market power. Comparing the results of APT 
and market power, the relation between APT and market power is analyzed. Because the 
relation has not been shown with rigorous theoretical underpinnings (Meyer and von 
Cramon-Taubadel, 2004), this paper tries to offer some empirical evidence of it. 
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the concept and the model of 
APT  are  explained,  then  the  empirical  analysis  using  TAR  model  is  conducted.  In 
section  3,  market  power  of  exporting  or  importing  countries  is  estimated  using  LQ 
model. Finally, the relation between APT and market power is considered, then this 
study is closed with some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Asymmetric price transmission 
2.1 Overview APT is a popular research topic, as mentioned in the survey paper by Meyer and von 
Cramon-Taubadel (2004). Price transmission is said to be asymmetric if the speed of 
adjustment of the output price is different after the input price increases or decreases. In 
particular, APT is positive if the output price adjusts more rapidly when the input price 
increases  than  when  it  decreases.  A  positive  APT  means  that  the  squeezed  margin 
restores more quickly than does the stretched margin. It also indicates that the price 
transmission has downward rigidity. In contrast, negative APT denotes that the output 
price adjusts more rapidly when the input price decreases than when it increases. Thus, 
the stretched margin is restored more quickly than the squeezed margin, and the price 
transmission has upward rigidity. 
Following the method of Enders and Granger (1998), many empirical studies 
have been conducted using a TAR model to estimate APT with cointegration tests. The 
coverage of previous empirical studies of APT that use the TAR model for agricultural 
products includes the Ghanaian maize market in Abdulai (2000), the Swiss pork market 
in Abdulai (2002), wheat export prices in major wheat-producing countries in Ghoshray 
(2002), the French marine products in Gonzales et al. (2003), the French vegetable 
market in Hassan and Simioni (2001), the U.S. dairy market in Awokuse and Wang 
(2009), the Nepalese rice market in Sanogo and Amadou (2010), and Indonesian oil palm market in Nakajima et al. (2010). 
 
2.2 TAR model 
Below, the TAR model based on Enders and Siklos (2001) is explained. Denote  it p  
and  ot p   as the input and output prices at time  t. The long-run relationship between 
it p   and  ot p   is represented using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression as follows: 
t it ot p p         (1) 
where     and     are  parameters,  and  t    is  the  disturbance  term,  which  may  be 
serially correlated. According to Engle and Granger (1987), if  it p   and  ot p   are part of 
a non-stationary process and  it p    and  ot p    are part of a stationary process (that is, if 
they are first-difference stationary (I(1)) variables), then Eq. (1) may indicate a spurious 
regression.  If  the  residual  series    t  ˆ   is  stationary,  however,  then  it p   and  ot p   are 
said  to  be  cointegrated.  Therefore,  it  is  necessary  to  conduct  unit  root  tests  and 
cointegration tests on  it p   and  ot p   to avoid a spurious regression. 
In a TAR model, a cointegration test is performed using    t  ˆ   from Eq. (1) in 
























t I   (3) 
where  t I   is the Heaviside indicator function, and     is the super-consistent estimator 
of threshold  1  t    calculated following Chan (1993).  t    is the white noise disturbance 
term and satisfies the following conditions:   
  0 E  t  ,   
2 2 E    t ,    0 E  j t      j t  .  (4) 
The necessary and sufficient condition for    t  ˆ   to be stationary is as follows 
(Petrucelli and Woolford, 1984):   
0 1   ,  0 2   , and     1 1 1 2 1        for any   .  (5) 
T   is the lag order that satisfies the conditions of Eq. (4) and (5) and minimizes the BIC 
(Bayesian information criteria). 
A  cointegration  test  is  performed  by  testing  0 2 1     ;  i.e.,  if  the  null 
hypothesis of  0 2 1       is rejected, then  it p   and  ot p   are said to be cointegrated. 
APT can be tested in the same model to compare the absolute values of  1    and  2  . If 
2 1      is  rejected  and  2 1    ,  then  the  negative  discrepancies  from  the 
equilibrium error adjust more rapidly than the positive discrepancies, which indicates 
positive  APT.  On  the  other  hand,  if  2 1      is  rejected  and  2 1    ,  then  the 
positive  deviations  adjust  toward  the  equilibrium  error  more  rapidly  than  do  the 
negative deviations, which indicates negative APT. There  is  another  approach  to  represent  the  adjustment  process,  that  is,  the 
momentum TAR (M-TAR). The M-TAR model is the same as in Eq. (2) and (3) except 
that  1  t    in  Eq.  (3)  is  replaced  with  1   t  .  The  TAR  model  and  M-TAR  model 
correspond  to  the  two  asymmetric  adjustment  processes,  Deepness  and  Steepness 
(Sichel,  1993).  In  both  models,  however,  2 1      indicates  positive  APT  and 
2 1      indicates negative APT. The model selection may be based on information 
criteria such as Bayesian information criteria (BIC). 
 
2.3 Empirical results 
2.3.1 Data 
The input price was three month lags of canola futures prices for the nearest contract 
month  in  the  Winnipeg  market,  which  was  obtained  from  “Cereals  and  Oilseeds 
Review” in Statistics Canada. Three month lags were taken because contracts between 
buyers and sellers are generally made in several months before the commodity clears 
through customs in the exporting country. In the empirical analysis below, two and four 
month lags were also employed to check the sensitivity of the lags. The output prices 
were Canada’s canola export prices to Japan, the U.S. and the sum of countries without 
Japan  (represented  by  the  rest  of  the  world,  ROW).  The  data  were  obtained  from “Canadian  International  Merchandise  Trade  Database”  in  Statistics  Canada.  Both 
datasets included monthly data from January 1988 to December 2009. The total sample 
size was 264. The futures prices and export prices to Japan were shown in Fig. 1. It 
seems that futures prices of several month prior correspond to the actual export prices, 
which is consistent with the description above. The original data of both the input and 
output prices are in Canadian dollar per metric tons. In the TAR estimations, these series 
were transformed into natural logarithmic form as is always done in empirical analyses 
of TAR models (Ben-Kaabia and Gil, 2007). 
 
2.3.2 Unit root tests 
To test whether the price series are I(1) variables, augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests 
were conducted. The results are shown in Table 1. The null hypothesis that the series 
have a unit root is not rejected for the level series, but it is for the first-difference series. 
Therefore, the price series mentioned above can be said to be I(1) variables. The test 
statistics shown in Table 1 are those achieved by including intercepts (but not trends) in 
the test equations. Similar results were obtained by including intercepts and trends in 
the test equations, which are not shown here to save space.   
 2.3.3 TAR estimations 
The results are shown in Table 2. The lag order for each model was determined by 
minimizing the BIC when the conditions of Eq. (4) and (5) are satisfied. Based on both 
the TAR model and the M-TAR model, I can conclude that the futures prices and export 
prices  to  each  country  are  cointegrated because the    statistics  in each  model  are 
much larger than those at the critical 1% significance level in Enders and Siklos (2001). 
According  to  that  paper,  the     statistics  at  a  1%  significance  level  for  250 
observations  and  four  lagged  changes  are  10.18  for  TAR  and  8.47  for  M-TAR.  As 
shown in Enders and Siklos (2001), the    statistic tends to decrease as the number of 
observation increases, and it tends to increase as the number of lags increases. Therefore, 
it is reasonable to conclude that the null of no cointegration is rejected at the 1% level in 
each model. In fact, the    statistics obtained in this paper are far beyond the values 
shown above. 
Regarding the results for Japan, although the null hypothesis that  2 1      is 
not rejected at the 10% level based on the TAR model, the null is rejected at the 1% 
level  based  on  the M-TAR  model,  and  2 1    .  It  follows that price transmission 
from Canadian canola prices to export prices for Japan is symmetric in the TAR model 
and that there is positive APT in the M-TAR model. Based on the BICs, the value is lower in M-TAR than that in TAR model. Hence, the conclusion may be that Canada 
enjoys  long-standing  excess  profits  in  terms  of  price  transmission  over  Japan  by 
exporting canola, that is, increased margin is restored more slowly than is decreased 
margin. It implies that Canada has more power to determine the export prices to Japan. 
However, it is not analyzed that Canada has market power over Japan using TAR model. 
Therefore, market power estimations are conducted in the next section. 
Regarding  the  results  for  ROW,  the  null  hypothesis  that  2 1      is  not 
rejected at the 10% level based on the TAR model, but it is rejected at te 5% level based 
on the M-TAR model, and  2 1    , which means negative APT. According to the 
BICs, M-TAR model is preferred and the conclusion may be that importing countries 
other than Japan enjoys long-lasting excess profits in terms of price transmission over 
Canada. The implication is that importing countries other than Japan has more power to 
determine  canola  prices  than  does  Canada.  The  results  for  the  U.S.,  which  is  the 
representative country in ROW, shows that the null is rejected at the 1% level based on 
both the TAR and M-TAR model. Negative APT  2 1      was found significantly, 
and the results are consistent with that of ROW. 
To check sensitivity of choosing lags in futures prices, TAR estimations using 
futures  prices  with  two  and  four  lags  were  also  conducted.  Although  the  parameter values changed slightly, the conclusion of the significance of APT was totally the same 
as those with three lags. 
 
3. Market power 
3.1 Motivation 
As market power is defined by price-cost margin, the existence of APT do not 
necessarily mean the existence of market power, although the relation was referred in 
literature. Hence, this paper is motivated by investigating the relation. 
Perloff et al. (2007) surveyed various methodology of estimating market power. 
There  are  two  assumptions  regarding  the  games  that  firms  play,  that  is,  static  and 
dynamic. In a sequence of static games, each firm maximizes its current profit given its 
belief about rivals behavior and the assumption that actions in  other periods do not 
affect behavior in this period. Meanwhile, in a dynamic game, each firm maximizes its 
expected present discounted value of the stream of its future profits. Considering the 
possibility of dynamic aspect of Canada and Australia in canola exports to Japan, this 
paper employed the dynamic model to estimate market powers of the exporters. 
Previous studies of estimating market power with dynamic model focused on 
the use of LQ model because it offers closed-form solutions in a dynamic problem. Such studies include Karp and Perloff (1989), Karp and Perloff (1993), and Deodhar 
and  Sheldon  (1996)  for  industry  level  approach,  and  Chalil  (2009)  for  firm  level 
approach.  The  models  employed  are  the  same,  which  is  explained  in  the  next 
subsection. 
There  are  two  types  of  dynamic  strategies,  that  is,  open-loop  and  Markov 
perfect (Perloff et al., 2007). With open-loop strategies, firms believe that their rivals’ 
strategies do not depend on state variables, such as a level of capital or a stock of loyal 
customers, that affects rival’s future actions. On the other hand, with Markov strategies, 
firms understand that their current actions affect the state variables. Firms take their 
rivals’ strategies as given and understand that by altering the state variables they can 
affect  rivals’  future  actions.  The  open-loop  equilibrium  (OLE)  can  be  obtained  by 
solving  a  one-agent  optimal  control  problem,  while  the  Markov  perfect  equilibrium 
(MPE) requires the solution to a game. 
 
3.2 Linear-quadratic dynamic model 
Assume that Japan imports canola from Canada and Australia, and Canadian canola and 






jt ij i it q b a p ,  (6) 
where  it p   indicates  real  import  price  of  Japan  from  country  i   ( 2 , 1  i ,  which 
indicate Canada and Australia, respectively) in period  t,  jt q   indicates import quantity 
of Japan from country  j   ( 2 , 1  j , which indicate Canada and Australia, respectively), 
and  i a   and  ij b   are parameters. 
Each country has constant marginal costs  it c   with respect to contemporaneous 
exports  it q . The change in output from one period to the next is defined as: 
     it it it q q u ,  (7) 
where     is the duration of a period, which is assumed to be 1 in this paper. Then the 
cost of changing output is quadratic in the rate of change: 
     it it it u u 2 0  .  (8) 
0 0  it    in this paper, which is generally assumed in literature. Adjustment costs are 
assumed  to  be  positive  whenever  the  change  in  the  state  variable  is  non-zero.  For 
dynamic problems, it is necessary that  0   , while  0     means the problem is static. 
In  period  t ,  country  i   wants  to  maximize  its  expectation  of  the  present 




























1 ,  (9) 
where     is a discount factor, which is assumed to be known. Hence, value function is written as: 




























s.t.  1 , 1 ,     t i it t i u q q . 
(10) 
Here  q  is a state variable and  u   is a control variable. Then, the Bellman equation is 
written as: 
      it it
it
it it it it it q V u
u









     ,  (11) 
1 ,    t i it it q q u .  (12) 
where  1 ,
~
  t i it q q . (11) is written in matrix notation as: 
                
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t
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1 ,  (13) 
where  i e   is  a  column  vector  of  zeroes  with  a  one  in  the  i th  position,  e   is  an 
n-dimensional column vector consisting entirely of ones,  i K   is an  n n   matrix of 
zeroes  with  b s  on  the  ith  column  and  the  ith  row,  except  for  the    i i,   element, 
which  contains  b 2 ,  and  i S   is  an  n n   matrix  consisting  of  zeroes  except  for  the 
  i i,   element,  which  contains   .  it    contains  it a   and  it c ,  and  it it x βi      and 
it it t i     x Φ x 1 , , where  t x   are  exogenous  variables  and  it    is  an  i.i.d.  random 
variable with zero mean. (12) is also written in matrix notation as: 
1 t    t t Gq g q ,  (14) 
for some  t g   and  G.  
3.3 Estimation method 
In an empirical analysis, the demand equations (6) and the adjustment equations (14) are 
to be estimated. Then  G  and the demand slope parametes  b  that consist of  i K   are 
derived. Given   ,  and  using  b  and  i K , market  power parameters and adjustment 
parameters can be calculated. The first-order condition for profit maximization is solved 
using Eq. (13) and (14). However, the solutions are different according to the strategies 
mentioned above. The solutions for OLE and MPE are shown as follows. 
 
3.3.1 Solution for OLE 
Given a value of   , the first-order condition corresponding to (13) and (14) is: 
     i i i i i i    y e G I G I G v K 

  
1 ,  (15) 
where  i v   is an  n  dimensional column vector with one in the  i th position and  ij v  
elsewhere.  i j ij q q v      ( j i j i   , 2 , 1 , )  indicates  country  i ’s  conjectures  for  the 
outputs of the rival. Using estimated  G  and demand slope parametes  b  that consist 
of  i K , each firm’s conjectural variation is solved as follows: 
12 11 12 11 12 2 b b y y v   , 
21 22 21 22 21 2 b b y y v   . 
(16) i    are also solved as follows: 
12 12 1 y b   , 
21 21 2 y b   . 
(17) 
For the estimated dynamic system to make sense, it must have properties as 
follows. First, the dynamic system of control is asymptotically stable if the absolute 
eigenvalues of matrix  G  are less than one. Second, the adjustment parameter in each 
of the models is positive (dynamic property):  0  i  . 
 
3.3.2 Solution for MPE 
To estimate  i v   and  i    in the MPE case, define the vectors 
         i i K G G G G I w vec
1        
  ,  (18) 
                i i i e e I I G G I G G G G I z                
 vec
1  ,  (19) 
where    is Kronecker product and vec operator stacks the columns of the matrix. The 
inverse  vec  operation  is  then  used  to “rematricize”  i w   and  i z   to  obtain  the  2 2  
matrices  i W   and  i Z . In MPE, the necessary condition corresponding to (13) and (14) 
is: 
    i i i i i i i i i i i     
* 1 y e G v Z e e W K       
 ,  (20) 
 3.4 Empirical results 
3.4.1 Data 
it p   and  it q   are  Japan’s  import  unit  prices  and  quantity  of  canola  (low  erucic  acid 
rapeseed), respectively, from Canada and Australia. The data are obtained from Trade 
Statistics of Japan, Ministry of Finance. In the demand equations, the popuolation of 
Japan is included as an exogenous demand shifter. Time trend and a dummy variable are 
also indluded, the latter of which is one in the years 2007 and 2008 when the canola 
prices were much higher than other years. The price data were deflated using Japan’s 
CPI (2005=100), which is obtained from IMF-IFS (International Financial Statistics). 
These data are annual series from 1992 to 2009. The starting year was selected as 1992 
because canola imports from Australia to Japan was very few before 1992 (less than 100 
tons) and the unit values were very expensive. 
 
3.4.2 Results 
First, the linear demand system of Eq. (6) with the exogenous variables were estimated 
using Zellner’s seemingly uncorrelated regressions (SUR). The result is shown in Table 
3. Next, the adjustment equations (Eq. (14)) with trend and the dummy variable were 
estimated using SUR. The result is shown in Table 4. For the estimated dynamic system to make sense, it must have three properties: 
(i) stable system property:  2 2 22 11     G G   and  1 1 21 12 22 11     G G G G , 
(ii) market power index:  1 1    ij v , 
(iii) adjustment parameter:  0  i  . 
Chalil (2009) showed the stability condition (i) in the case of two firm model, which is 
the same as this study. (ii) indicates that the market structure lies between collusion and 
price taking. If  1   ij v , firm  i  has no market power, which means that the firm is 
price  taker.  On  the  other  hand, if  1  ij v , firm  i  has  a  monopolistic  power.  And  if 
1 1    ij v , the firm has an intermediate level of market power. 
Imposing  these  properties  using  a  classical  approach  is  analyzed  to  be 
extremely difficult, if not possible (Karp and Perloff, 1993). Rather than estimating the 
unconstrained  system  and  hoping  that  the  point  estimates  lie  in  the  desired  range, 
previous  studies  employed  Bayesian  techniques  to  impose  the  restrictions.  The 
methodology  used  here  is  the  same  as  the  previous  studies,  where  Monte  Carlo 
numerical integration with importance sampling is employed. 
The result of the Bayesian estimations of the parameters using 100,000 random 
sample are shown in Table 5. The result indicates that  ij v   for Canada is higher than that 
of Australia both in OLE and MPE, which implies that Canada has more market power than does Australia.   
 
4. Conclusion 
The empirical results of APT and market power lead us to the conclusion that Canada 
has  market  power over Japan in  exporting canola, and that price transmission from 
Canadian canola domestic prices to export prices to Japan is asymmetric so that the 
excess margin of Canada is not restored to the equilibrium level more quickly than is its 
excess loss. It follows from this finding that possession of market powr is consistent 
with positive APT. 
On the other hand, Australia, whose share in Japan’s canola imports has been 
one nineth of Canada, does not have market power over Japan. The implication of this is 
that it is reasonable for Japan to import more canola from Australia, or to diversify the 
origins. 
The  contributions  of  this  paper  include  that  APT  from  Canadian  canola 
domestic prices to export prices were estimated using TAR model, that market powers 
of Canada and Australia were estimated using LQ model, and that it gave an empirical 
evidence  that  positive  APT  is  relevant  to  the  existence  of  market  power.  A  further 
direction of this study will be to construct such a way that price transmission and market power are jointly estimated. In addition, further research on theoretical connection of 
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Table 1 Unit root test results 
  ADF 
Futures Price 
level  -2.62 (1) * 
1st diff.  -12.06 (0) *** 
Exports to Japan 
level  -2.56 (1) 
1st diff.  -21.02 (0) *** 
Exports to the U.S. 
level  -2.48 (10) 
1st diff.  -10.05 (9) *** 
Exports to ROW 
level  -2.42 (10) 
1st diff.  -8.06 (7) *** 
Note: 
1. Values are statistics for ADF test. 
2. Values in parentheses indicate lag order based on the Akaike Information Criteria 
(AIC). 
3. In the equations for all tests, the intercept (no trend) is included. 
4. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. 
 Table 2 TAR estimation results 
Model  1    2    lags      Asym.  Q(6)  BIC    
Japan 
TAR 
-0.25  ***  -0.39    *** 
1 
17.22  ***   2.22    4.69  -2002.6 
-0.09 
(0.07)    (0.08)          [0.14]      [0.58]  2nd 
Japan 
M-TAR 
-0.24  ***  -0.56  *** 
1 
20.34  ***   7.75  ***  4.27  -2008.1 
-0.07 
(0.06)    (0.11)          [0.01]    +  [0.64]  2nd 
ROW 
TAR 
-0.78  ***  -0.65  *** 
2 
32.44  ***   0.98    9.39  -1582.3 
0.12 
(0.12)    (0.10)          [0.32]      [0.15]  3rd 
ROW 
M-TAR 
-0.93  ***  -0.64  *** 
2 
34.63  ***   4.46  **  9.82  -1585.8 
0.13 
(0.14)    (0.09)          [0.04]    -  [0.13]  3rd 
U.S. 
M-TAR 
-0.76  ***  -0.39  *** 
0 
70.60  ***   8.73  ***  1.89  -1376.1 
0.13 
(0.07)    (0.11)          [0.00]    -  [0.93]  1st 
U.S. 
M-TAR 
-0.78  ***  -0.43  *** 
0 
70.40  ***   8.46  ***  1.69  -1375.8 
0.15 
(0.07)    (0.10)          [0.00]    -  [0.95]  1st 
Notes: 
1.  1    and  2    are the adjustment coefficients in Eq. (2). 
2. “lags” is the lag length in (2). 
3.    is the F statistic for the test of the null hypothesis  0 2 1     . The rejection regions are based on Enders and Siklos (2001). 
4. “Asym.” is the F statistic for the test  2 1    . + and - indicate significant positive 
and negative APT, respectively. 
5. Q(6) represents the Q statistics from the Portmanteau test for white noise, whose null 
hypothesis is that the error term is white noise up to 6 lags. 
6. In BIC, “1st”, “2nd”, “3rd” indicate that the value are the 1st, 2nd, 3rd smallest, 
respectively. 
7.     is the threshold in (3). 
8. For each result, the values in ( ) denote standard errors, and the values in [ ] denote p 
values. 







 Table 3 Results of the demand equations 
  Price of Canada  Price of Australia 
Imports from Canada  0.0038  (0.0099)  0.0057  (0.0108) 
Imports from Australia  -0.0033  (0.0182)  0.0056  (0.0198) 
Population of Japan  -2.8033  (6.4971)  -9.7573  (7.0638) 
Time trend  885.08  (1079.28)  2211.5*  (1173.4) 
2007 and 2008 dummy  19833.3***  (5278.0)  19812.1***  (5738.4) 
Constant  376453.2  (810201)  1240558  880877.8 
Nunber of observations  18  18 
2 R   0.75  0.77 
Durbin-Watson statistic  1.56  1.47 
Notes: 
1. Values in parentheses denote standard errors. 




 Table 4 Results of the adjustment equations 
  Imports from Canada  Imports from Australia 
Imports from Canada (1 lag)  -0.0015  (0.2485)  -0.1395  (0.1981) 
Imports from Australia (1 lag)  -0.1547  (0.2656)  0.5753**  (0.2118) 
Time trend  22449.3*  (11909.5)  7606.0  (9496.7) 
2007 and 2008 dummy  183971.5  (107825.9)  -173185.7*  (85981.1) 
Constant  1579571***  (403203.2)  308930.2  321517.1 
Nunber of observations  17  17 
2 R   0.60  0.67 
Durbin-Watson statistic  1.48  2.44 
Notes: 
1. Values in parentheses denote standard errors. 





 Table 5 Results of market power and adjustment parameters 
Strategy  12 v   21 v   1    2   
OLE  -0.4960  -0.7656  0.0039  0.0630 
MPE  0.3832  -0.2145  27.4617  5.6325 
Notes: 
1. The parameters are calculated using the methodology mentioned above with 100,000 
Monte Carlo replication. 
 
 
 Figure 1 Futures prices and export prices to Japan 
Source: Cereals and Oilseeds Review and Canadian International Merchandise Trade 












'88.1 '92.1 '96.1 '00.1 '04.1 '08.1
C
a
n
$
/
t
o
n
Futures Japan